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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
0000O0000

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 940241-CA

BRANT K. STRAUSBURG,
Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.
•ooooOooooJURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction over appeals from Circuit Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(d) (1990).
STATEMENT OF THE I3SVES
1.

Did

defendant

fail

to

preserve

for

appeal

the

horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test and Miranda issues?
2.

If defendant preserved the HGN issue for appeal, does

the test meet the "inherent reliability" standard enunciated in
the Phillips, Kofford. Rimmasch line of cases for admissibility
under URE 702?
3.
were

If defendant preserved the Miranda issue for appeal,

the police

required

to advise

him of

his

rights

before

questioning him?
4.

If

the

HGN

results

and

defendant's

statements

were

admitted in error, was it prejudicial?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rulings on issues of law are reviewed under a "correction of
error" standard.

City of Monticello v. Christensen. 788 P.2d 518

1

(Utah) cert, denied. Ill S.Ct. 120 (1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of
alcohol causing an injury accident and leaving the scene of an
injury accident.

Trial on those charges was scheduled for March

3, 1994 before the Honorable James S. Sawaya.
On March 2, 1994, a day before trial, defendant
motion to suppress the HGN test results.

While in Judge Sawayafs

chambers minutes before trial, defense counsel
that defendant had filed a motion.
without

argument

filed a

told the court

The court summarily denied it

from either counsel.

During

the

trial, the

court overruled defendant's objection to the HGN evidence.
During trial, defendant also objected to statements he made
to a police officer about the traffic accident.

But the court

overruled the objection.
On March 4, 1994, a jury found defendant

guilty of both

charges and was sentenced on March 31, 1994.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Shortly after midnight on May 6, 1994, defendant was driving
his flatbed semi-truck north on 900 East in Salt Lake County,
Utah.

(Trail Transcript

at

165, 168) (hereinafter T) .

raining and the roads were slick.

(T. 19, 57, 170) .

It was
As he

approached Van Winkle Boulevard

(5600 South), the left-hand turn

signal was changing to yellow.

(T. 18, 169) .

Despite the road

conditions, defendant hurled his 80,000 pound truck through the
light, causing his trailer to jackknife.

(T. 53, 125).

The

trailer slammed into a white car stopped in the adjacent lane,
2

which in turn hit a car stopped in front of it.
53) .

(T. 17, 18, 23,

The force of the impact caused a loud noise and spun the

two

cars

around,

shooting

them

into

the

middle

of

the

intersection.

(T. 20, 28, 31, 34). The occupants in each car

were injured.

(T. 21, 29, 34). Neither driver knew what had hit

them.

(T. 20, 28, 30) .
Despite the loud noise and extensive damage to the cars,

defendant failed to stop.

(T. 24, 31, 34) .

Witnesses to the

accident were able to get a description of defendant's fleeing
truck, which was broadcast to law enforcement in the area. (T.
23, 39, 48).
Defendant continued along Van Winkle to 2700 South, down to
State Street and back to 3300 South where he parked his semitruck in front of his father's house on 500 East, some fortyminutes

after the accident.

(T. 39, 40, 130, 178) .

Before

stopping, Officer David Richards of the Granite School District
Police

Department

had

spotted

South and pulled up behind.

defendant's
(T. 39) .

semi-truck

on

3300

When Richards briefly

spoke to defendant and his passenger, Mitchell Webb, he told them
that their truck matched the description of a truck involved in
an hit-and-run accident.

(T. 41-42).

He also smelled an odor of

alcohol and noticed that their eyes were bloodshot and glassy.
(T. 42).
Richards radioed the sheriff's office.
Mohler was the first to arrive.

(T

.3)

(T. 43).

Sargent

He inspected the

truck and found white transfer paint on the trailer.

(T. 50).

Mohler then asked defendant whether he had been involved in an
3

accident on 9th East and Van Winkle.

(T. 55).

Defendant denied

being in an accident and stated that he had been up on Wasatch
Boulevard, coming down 3300 South where the truck was stopped.
(T. 55).

But when Mohler told him that there were witnesses,

defendant admitted to deputies he had been on 900 East and Van
Winkle.

(T. 56, 192).

At

trial,

defense

counsel

objected

to

this

evidence

simply stating "[y]our Honor, I would object at this point."

by
(T.

55). The court overruled the objection after a bench conference.
(T. 55) .

But defendant did not object when Deputy

testified about the same conversation.
At

that

point,

Mohler

turned

Mortensen

(T. 192).

the

investigation

Mortensen to access whether defendant was impaired.
Mortensen

had

received

impaired drivers.

specialized

(T. 70).

training

years,

he

had

(T. 66, 83).

investigated

to

(T. 54) .

looking

for

He had attended the Utah Highway

Patrol DUI course and National Highway Traffic
drug recognition school.

in

over

at

least

Safety

(NHTSA)

During the last
fifty

DUI

cases

administered field sobriety test approximately 400 times.

four
and
(T.

65, 83, 94).
When Mortensen spoke with defendant, he too noticed an odor
of alcohol on his breath and that his eyes were red and glassy.
Defendant's speech was slightly slurred.
these

physical

demonstrated
finger count,

five

characteristics,
field

sobriety

(2) one-leg stand,

and (5) horizontal gaze nystagmus.
4

(T. 71-72) .

Mortensen
tests

Based upon

explained

to defendant:

(3) heel-to-toe,
(T. 74-82).

and

(1) the

(4) alphabet

On the finger count test, defendant performed it four times,
instead of the requested

three, and touched

fingers, instead of the tips.

(T. 74-75).

the sides of his

A person who fails to

touch the tips of his fingers and performs the test more times
than requested,
follow

shows a lack of concentration

instructions.

(T.

defendant failed this test.

76).

Because

of

and

ability

these

to

errors,

(T. 76).

The defendant also failed the one-leg stand test.

(T. 77).

Mortensen told defendant to raise his foot three to six inches
off the ground and to count to thirty in one thousand increments.
(T. 77).

When the deputy gives this test, he is looking for

whether people hop, use their arms for balance, put their foot
down or stop the test.

(T. 77). Defendant made several of these

mistakes: he lost his balance, put his foot down on the count of
five and stopped the test at fifteen. (T. 77).
In the heel-to-toe test, the deputy told defendant to hold
his hands to his sides, take nine steps down with the heel of one
foot touching the toe of his other foot, turn around, and walk
back in the same way, taking seven steps.
used his arms
walking.

for balance

(T.

78).

Defendant

and had difficulty balancing

while

(T. 78).

On the HGN test, Mortensen held a pen twelve to fifteen
inches in front of each of a defendant's eyes to determine three
clues:

(i) whether

his

eyes

smoothly

followed

the pen,

(ii)

whether his eyes showed nystagmus at maximum deviation and (iii)
the angle of onset of nystagmus in each of his eyes.
102).

(T. 80-81,

On this test, defendant's eyes could not pursue the pen
5

smoothly and he had noticeable nystagmus at maximum deviation.
(T.

81) .

Mortensen

could

not

recall

the

angel

of

onset

of

nystagmus for defendant. (T. 81).
When the State began questioning Mortensen at trial about
HGN, defendant objected when counsel stated

" [y]our Honor,

going to object to the introduction of this evidence."
The court responded with "[o]bjection overruled.
something the jury can consider.

Go ahead."

I'm

(T. 79).

I think it's

(T. 79).

The final test defendant performed was the alphabet test.
(T.

82) .

Mortensen

asked

him

to recite

the

alphabet

twice,

starting with the letter B and ending with the letter S.
82) .

(T.

He successfully completed the first recitation, but failed

the second by starting with the letter B.

(T. 82).

Based upon defendant's physical characteristics and failure
to adequately perform all of the field sobriety tests, Mortensen
believed that defendant was impaired and arrested him.
88) .

(T.

82,

When he then read defendant the DUI admonition, he agreed

to take a chemical test.

(T.

83-85).

However, while on his way

to take the test, defendant decided not to take it.
the deputy that "I'm not going to lie anymore."

He stated to
(T. 86).

"I

believe that I've had four beers in the last hour and a half, and
I believe this would put me over the limit.
do it this way."
At

trial,

And it's easier to

(T. 86, 87).
defendant

claimed

that

he

did

accident and was confused as to where he had been.
174) .

not

hear

the

(T. 170, 173,

He also claimed that he had not felt any effect from the

alcohol and performed well on all the field sobriety tests.
6

(T.

179, 188).

The jury was not persuaded by his explanations.

At

the conclusion of the trail, they convicted defendant of driving
under the influence causing an injury accident and leaving the
scene of an injury accident.

(T. 237).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant has failed to preserve the HGN issue for appeal.
His motion was untimely.
basis

for

the

court's

No record was created to establish the
denial

of

the

motion.

Neither

did

he

properly object to the evidence when offered by the State during
trial.
If defendant preserved the HGN issue, the test is inherently
reliable and the trial court could have taken judicial notice of
its reliability
supporting

based upon existing

case

law.

The

State

scientific

was

not

literature

required

to

and

make

a

foundational showing of the test's scientific grounding through
expert witnesses.
Defendant
appeal.

also

failed

to preserve

the Miranda

issue

for

Defendant did not properly object to the admission of

his statements and failed to object when a second police witness
testify about the same conversation.
If

defendant

preserved

this

issue,

the

police

were

not

required to give him a Miranda warning because he was not in
custody.

The questioning of defendant was merely investigatory.

Whether

the

HGN

results

admitted, is harmless error.

and

statements

were

improperly

All of the other evidence in the

case provided a basis for the jury to convict defendant.

7

ARGUMENT
I.

COURT SHOULD NOT REACH HGN AND MIRANDA ISSUES BECAUSE
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THEM FOR APPEAL.
If appellants fail to properly preserve an issue for appeal,

they have waived that issue.
n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

State v. Brown, 856 P. 2d 358, 359

The burden rests on the party raising

the issue on appeal to take those steps necessary to preserve the
issue for appellate review and determination.

Id. ; Broberg v.

Hess, 782 P. 2d 198, 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Appellate courts

will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.
Ong Int'l

(U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455

(Utah 1993).
A. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HGN WAS UNTIMELY.
Rule

12(b)(2)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Criminal

Procedure

requires all motions "concerning the admissibility of evidence"
be raised at least five days prior to trial.

"Failure of the

defendant ... to make requests which must be made prior to trial
or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof."
Rule 12(d).
In this case, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the
HGN test on March 2, 1994.
the trial was held.

On March 3, 1994 -- one day later --

Defendant's motion violated the five day

rule of Rule 12 and consequently, was untimely.

Because it was

untimely, he has waived his right to object to admission of the
test.

8

Moreover,

no

hearing

was

ever

scheduled

on

the

motion.

Instead, defendant raised the motion for the first time in the
judge's chambers minutes before the trial began.

The State never

had the opportunity to object to the timeliness of the motion.
Nor

did

support

it
of

motion.

have

the

its use

opportunity

of

the HGN

to present
test

or

to

any

evidence

rebut

in

defendant's

As a result, the court never had the opportunity to

consider evidence supplied by both sides and make an informed
ruling.

We do not know the basis for the trial court's denial of

defendant's motion because there is no record of its decision nor
a written order.
consider

in

On appeal, this court has no information to

determining

the

propriety

of

the

trial

court's

actions.
B. DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROPERLY OBJECT TO ADMISSION
OF HGN AND HIS STATEMENTS DURING TRIAL.
Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires a timely,
specific
State

v.

objection
Range1.

to preserve
866

P.2d

evidentiary

607,

611

errors

(Utah

for appeal.

Ct.

App.

1993)

(contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation
of error must be made part of the trail
appellate
Whittle.

court
780

will

P.2d

review

819,

such

820-21

claim

(Utah

court

on

record

appeal);

1989)

before

State

(specific,

v.

timely

objections must be made to preserve issue for appeal).
When

the

State

began

questioning

Mortensen

about

HGN,

defense counsel stated "[y]our Honor, I'm going to object to the
introduction of this evidence."
the objection.

(T. 79) .

(T. 79).

The court overruled

The record shows defendant at no time

9

stated the basis for his objection as required by Rule

103(a).

Therefore, defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal.
This failure is not cured by defendant's motion to suppress.
In State v. Lasey. 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983), the supreme court
held that under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, a specific
objection is required even when a pretrial motion to suppress has
been made.

The court reasoned that even though a pretrial motion

to suppress evidence had been made and denied, an objection to
the admissibility of the evidence at trial should have been made
because the trial judge was not the same judge who had ruled on
the motion and there was no indication in the record that an
evidentiary hearing on the motion had been conducted.
The
Johnson,

court
748

further

P.2d

elaborated

1069, 1071

this

decision

(Utah 1987),

in

State

by holding

v.

that

a

defendant is not required to object or renew his or her objection
at trial to preserve an issue for appeal when the trial judge is
the same one who ruled on the pretrial motion and when the record
or transcript indicates that a hearing was held on the motion.
While the trial judge in this case was the same judge who
denied

defendant's

motion,

there

is

no

record

indicating that a hearing was ever held.

or

transcript

There is no record

because the discussion about defendant's motion was held in the
judge's chambers off the record.

Without a record, defendant was

required by Lacey to make a timely and specific objection when
the State introduced evidence about HGN.

Defendant

failed to

make a specific objection to the HGN evidence.
Defendant

also

failed

to preserve
10

the Miranda

issue

for

appeal.

When the State asked Mohler about the conversation he

have with the defendant, defense counsel stated "[y]our Honor, I
would object at this point."
then

held

record.

and

the

court

(T. 55) .

(T. 55).

A bench conference was

then overruled

Once

the objection

again, defendant

failed

to

on

the

state

a

specific objection on the record.
Furthermore, defendant
Mortensen

testified

about

failed
the

to make

same

any objection

conversation.

(T.

when
192) .

Without an objection, defendant waived his right to now claim on
appeal that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence.
II.

IF DEFENDANT PRESERVED HGN ISSUE FOR APPEAL, TRIAL
COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE BECAUSE TEST MEETS
THE "INHERENT RELIABILITY" REQUIREMENTS OF URE 702
AND DEFINED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT.
A.

THE "INHERENT RELIABILITY STANDARD" APPLIES TO THE
HGN TEST.

Beginning
(Utah

1980)

with

Phillipg

(predating

the

v, Jackson.
adoption

of

615
URE

P.2d

1230, 1234

702) , the

court

defined the requirements of the "inherent reliability" test for
admission of scientific evidence.
The courts in admitting new scientific evidence have
frequently relied on the practical application of a
principle in a given discipline or area of endeavor as
a sufficient indication of reliability ....
However,
the rule requiring general acceptance should not be too
restrictively applied.
[N]either newness nor lack of
absolute certainty in a test suffices to render it
inadmissible in court.
Every useful new development
must have its first day in court. (Citations omitted).
The Phillips court also stated that "[v]erification of the
basic

principle

and

its

application

11

through

widespread

replication

and

reliability."

practical
Id.

at

usage

is

1233.

an

The

appropriate

fact

that

indica

the

of

relevant

scientific evidence is new or knowledge of it is limited to a
small, specialized group of experts will not preclude a finding
of reliability.

id. at 1234.

In Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343, 1346-1348

(Utah 1987),

the court abandoned exclusive reliance on the Frye test in favor
of Utah Rule of Evidence

702, although

recognizing

that

Frye

The court further clarified in State v. Tuttle, 780

P.2d

might retain its validity in some instances.

1203,

1211

(Utah

admissibility

is

1989),

that

"inherent

the

threshold

reliability

of

requirement
the

for

scientific

principles and techniques upon which the proffered evidence is
based" under Rule 702.

State v. Rimmaschf 775 P.2d 388, 396-397

(Utah 1990), reiterated that "inherent reliability" rather that
"general acceptance" was the touchstone of admissibility and a
showing

of

general

acceptance

would

normally

also

establish

inherent reliability thus justifying admission of the evidence.
Defendant
circumstances

claims
the

that

Rimmasch

continuing

recognizes

requirement

to

in

meet

certain
the

standard for "novel" scientific principles or techniques.
396.

Frye
Id. at

In Rimmasch, the State argued that Rule 702 did away with

the Frye standard and Phillips

"inherent reliability"

standard

requiring only that the evidence be relevant and of assistance to
the

trier

of

fact.

The

court

specifically

"regardless of how Rule 702 phrases the general

stated
test

that

for the

admissibility of expert testimony, our case law superimposes a
12

more restrictive test whenever scientific evidence is at issue,
and that more restrictive test was set forth in Phillips." Jd. at
397.

That more restrictive test is "inherent reliability."

It

is against this standard by which this court should judge the
admissibility of the HGN test results.
B.

HGN IS INHERENTLY RELIABLE.

The

horizontal

physiological
measured
evidenced

by
in

gaze

correlation
blood

nystagmus
between

alcohol

individuals.1

content

test

degree
and

is
of

based

intoxication

degree

Specifically,

on

an

of

the
as

nystagmus

administering

officer, using an object held about twelve to fifteen inches away
from a suspect's face, will move that object across the suspect's
field

of vision

and

take note of

the

suspect's

eye

movement

(degree of nystagmus) in three ways: 1) ability of the suspect's
lateral eye movement to track the object smoothly, 2) degree of
pronounced nystagmus

(bouncing of the eye) at the angle of an

eye's maximum deviation, and 3) the angle at which the onset of
nystagmus becomes visible.2

The question is whether the three-

1

Aschan,
Different
Types
of
Alcohol
Nystagmus . Acta
Otolaryngologica Supp. 14 0:69; Lehti, The Effect of Blood Alcohol
Concentration pn the Onset of Gaze Nystagmus, 13 Blutalkohol 411
(1976) ; Simpson-Crawford and Slater, Eye Signs in Suspected
Drinking Drivers: Clinical Examination and Relation to Blood
Alcohol, N.Z. Med. J. (Aug. 1971); Wilkinson, Kime and Tharp,
Burns, Moskowitz, Development and Field Sobriety Test of
Psychophysical
Tests
for
DUI
Arrests:
U.S.
Dept.
of
Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
Office of Driver and Pedestrian Research, DOT-HS-8-01970 (March
1981)(hereinafter 1981 NHTSA Study).
2

Improved
Fielfl
Sobriety
Testing.
U.S.
Pep ' t
of
Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
DOT-HS-806-512 (January 1984)(hereinafter "1984 NHSTA Study").
13

part test is an accurate predictor of intoxication.
The HGN test has been in use for over 3 0 years, but has only
been adopted for use in DUI prosecutions since the early 1980's.
California

police

initially

observed

the

phenomenon

with

barbiturate users in the I960's.3
In

the

1970's,

Administration

the

National

Highway

Traffic

(NHTSA) contracted with the Southern

Safety

California

Research Institute to assess the field sobriety tests then in use
and

to

develop

a

standardized

test

battery.

Initially,

ten

different sobriety test were administered to 238 volunteers with
blood alcohol concentrations (BACs) between .00 and .15 percent.
The

three

"best" test were

then

selected

for

study: HGN, walk and turn and the one-leg stand.4
were administered to 297 volunteers with B A C s

from

additional
These tests
.00 to .18

percent. 5 NHTSA found that the same battery of tests administered
by police officers in the field correctly classified BAC as being
either above or below .10 percent eighty-one percent of the time.
The remaining
percent

classifications were

false negatives

9 percent positives

and 10

-- suggesting that there is not great

bias for either overestimation or underestimation.

The report

concluded, " [c]learly, nystagmus angle of onset is an excellent
tool for predicting the BAC when it is measured with sufficient

60 ALR 4th 1130-1131.
1981 NHSTA Study, supra at 2.
Id. at 72.
14

precision."6
In

1985,

Drs.

Goding

and

Dobie

from

the

University

of

Washington conducted a field study of HGN. 7

Forty-six patients

in

fifty-nine

an

emergency

room

setting

and

hundred

people

suspected of DUI had their blood alcohol concentrations estimated
by the angle of onset of HGN and then submitted to either a blood
or breath

test

to

confirm

the

results.

The

results

of

the

chemical test were not known to the person giving the HGN test.
In the emergency room group, ninety-six percent of people
with BAC's over .10 percent were correctly identified by HGN as
legally

intoxicated.

There

were

no

cases

where

BAC

was

incorrectly estimated above .10 percent in the absence of other
drugs known to cause nystagmus.
With the DUI suspects, there was a .878 correlation between
estimated

and

actual

BAC.

classified as intoxicated.
less than

Three

subjects

were

incorrectly

No subjects with an estimated BAC

.10 percent were incorrectly classified.

Goding and

Dobie concluded that alcohol gaze nystagmus is an effective tool
for estimating BAC. 8
In
nystagmus

1958,
and

Aschan

positional

electronystagmographic

6

differentiated

alcohol

recording:

alcohol

alcohol

nystagmus
gave

gaze
using

nystagmus

Id.

7

Goding and Dobie, Gfrzg Nystagmus
Laryngoscope 713 (July 1986).
8

between

Id. at 1.
15

and

Blood

Alcohol,

96

(deviation = 40 degrees) appeared when BAC rose above a certain
threshold (typically .06) and disappeared when BAC was less. 5
his

report,

Aschon

commented

that

In

while

the

electronystagmographic recording device may detect nystagmus at
.03 to
value

.05 percent, when observed only visually, a borderline
of

.08 percent

was

found. 10

Although

he

suggested

no

conclusion, it appears to be a logical assumption that under .08
percent, the nystagmus is too slight for it to constitute the
definite jerking or bouncing for which the officer is instructed
to look. 11

He also confirmed that the angle of onset decreases

as BAC increases.

The 0.778 correlation coefficient

found by

Lehti

to

of

corresponds

the

NHTSA

studies

finding

0.76

correlation of BAC to angle of onset. 12
A study presented in the Journal of the American Optometric
Association

concluded

that

by

correctly

identifying

eighty

percent of intoxicated drivers with a BAC over .10 percent, HGN
was

"more accurate than the traditional coordination or mental

computation tests previously used." 13

And a 1974 Finish study

concluded that the HGN and walk-and-line

(walk-and-turn)

tests

were the most accurate indicators of BAC levels in a test battery
9

Aschan, supra; See also Goding and Dobie, supra at 9.

10

Aschan, supra, at 76.

11

Id.

1

Lehti, supra.

2

13

Halperin and Yoltan, Is the Driver Drunk?
Sobriety Testing, 57:9 Journal of the American
Association 653 (Sept. 1986).
16

Oculomotor
Optometric

including

"finger-to-nose,

backwards,

time

and

place

picking

up

orientation,

matches,
and

counting

observations

of

general behavior. 14
Not only is HGN finding growing acceptance in the scientific
community, but also in a growing number of courts.

Some have

found it admissible under a "general acceptance" or "reliability",
test.

Arizona has been the leading jurisdiction in allowing

HGN evidence.

In State v. Superior Court

(Blake) . 718 P. 2d 171

(Ariz. 1986), the Arizona Supreme Court specifically found that
the HGN test meets the standard.

At the evidentiary hearing, the

court heard evidence from Dr. Burns, Director of the Southern
California Research Institute

(SCRI), one of the developers of

the standard battery of field sobriety tests and an author of the
NHTSA

study

and

a research

psychologist,

effects of alcohol on behavior.

specializing

in

the

She testified that SCRI found

HGN to be the best single index of intoxication because it is an
involuntary response based on the known principle that certain
substances,

including

alcohol,

cause

nystagmus.

She

further

testified that BAC can be estimated from the angle of onset of
nystagmus.
The court also heard testimony from Sargent Studdard of the
Los

Angeles

Police

Department,

one

of

the - pioneers

in

the

development of the HGN test, and Sargent Raynor of the Arizona
Department

of

Public

Safety.

They

testified

as

to

HGN's

usefulness in identifying DUI' s in the .10 to .15 percent range

Tharp et. al., supra at 1-2.
17

when a number of drivers were

able to pass

the other tests.

Studdard also testified that based on his experience in the field
and as a consultant to NHTSA, the accuracy of the HGN test in
identifying impaired drivers was between 80-90 percent.

Jd. at

173-174.
In addition to the foregoing testimony, the court considered
twenty-nine different articles on nystagmus in general and HGN in
particular listed in the appendices to the court's opinion.
court

then

establish

considered

probable

two

issues:

cause, and

(1)

(2) are

can

the

HGN

results

be

used

The
to

admissible

under the Frye standard.
The

court

observed

that

nystagmus

is

a

well-known

physiological phenomenon and that the HGN test was used by some
law enforcement agencies even before NHTSA commissioned the SCRI
study. The NHTSA found it the most sensitive of all tests, that
in a survey of 800 trained officers eighty percent rated it the
most sensitive and use of the test substantially increased DUI
arrests.

Therefore, in the hands of a trained officer, the HGN

test was reasonably trustworthy and could be used to establish
probable cause.

Id. at 176-177.

In determining whether the test results were admissible, the
court considered the relevant scientific community, recognizing
that the field was likely to be self-limiting, and whether there
was a general acceptance

in the appropriate disciplines.

The

court defined the appropriate disciplines as highway safety and
behavioral

psychology

criminalistics.

and

to

a

lesser

extent,

neurology

and

The court concluded based on its own research
18

listed

in Appendix B to the case, that professionals who had

studied the issue do not dispute the correlation between BAC and
1&.

nystagmus.

at 18 0.

Furthermore, the higher the BAC, the

earlier the onset of nystagmus.

And the court found that the

test had undergone sufficient scrutiny to be considered reliable.
Id. at 181.

It stated:

We believe that the HGN test satisfies the Frye
standards.
The
evidence
demonstrates
that
the
following propositions have gained general acceptance
in the scientific community:
(1) HGN occurs in
conjunction with alcohol consumption; (2) its onset and
distinctness are correlated to BAC; (3) BAC in excess
of
.10 percent can be estimated with reasonable
accuracy from the combination of the eye's tracking
ability, the angle of onset of nystagmus and the degree
of nystagmus at maximum deviation; and (4) officers can
be trained to observe these phenomena sufficiently to
estimate accurately whether BAC is above or below .10
percent.

Based on these findings, the court held the HGN test to be
admissible

as

intoxication

any

other

provided

sobriety

proper

test

foundation

officer's training and experience.

on
is

the
laid

issue
as

of

to

the

Id.

The court also held, however, that it was not admissible to
establish BAC over
because

its

inappropriate
violation

.10 percent in the absence of chemical test

recognized
to

prove

of Arizona

margin
being

of

over

error
the

statutes defining

per

would
se

a chemical

make

limit
test.

it

and

a

HGN

evidence may be used to corroborate a challenged breath test or
in an impairment case to establish being "under the influence"

19

but not to quantify BAC. Xd. 1 5 ; See also State ex. rel. McDougall
v.

Rickes,

778

P.2d

1358

(Ariz.

App.

1989);

State

ex

rel.

Hamilton v. City Court of Mesa, 799 P.2d 855 (Ariz. 1990).
At least three other courts, relying substantially on the
Blake opinion, have specifically held that the HGN test satisfies
Frye.

People v. Beunina. 592 N.E.2d

1222, 1227

Dist. 1992); State v. Garrett. 811 P.2d 488, 491
State v. Armstrong, 561 So. 2d 883, 886-887
1990) .

(111. App. 5
(Idaho 1991);

(La. App. 2 Cir.

Although Utah no longer requires Frye, meeting the Frye

standard

very

likely meets

the

inherent

reliability

standard.

Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396-397.
In People v. Ouinn, 580 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Dist. Ct. 1991), the
trial court heard testimony from nine expert witnesses including,
Dr. Burns, retired Sargent Studdard of the LAPD

(both of whom

testified in the Blake case), a medical doctor, an optometrist, a
toxicologist and several police officers.
was

asked

to

address

the

Frye

issue.

The appellate court
The

court

held

HGN

admissible but it is unclear whether it specifically held HGN
meets Frye or that it is not a scientific test requiring the Frye
analysis.

After a lengthy discussion, the court did state that

Frye did not require that the technique be infallible and that

15

Current HGN protocol advises that rather that estimate the
specific angle of onset, the officer only determine if he sees
nystagmus at 45 degrees or less.
The 45 degree angle roughly
corresponds to a .10 percent BAC and the lesser the angle, the
higher the BAC. Since .10 percent is the per se limit in all but
five states, and HGN is not intended as a substitute for a
chemical test, it is not thought necessary to determine BAC other
than whether it is likely to exceed .10 percent.
20

defendant's

requirements arguments went to the weight

and not

admissibility.
Many states have abandoned in whole or in part reliance on
Frye in admitting scientific evidence.
however,

have

a

admissibility.

threshold

showing

Some of these states,
of

reliability

before

In outlining its acceptance of the HGN test, the

Ohio Supreme Court, in addition to the 1981 NTHSA study, cited at
least

five other works or scientific

literature examining

the

relationship between alcohol ingestion and nystagmus, as will as
discussing the HGN test.

The same opinion also cited a 1984

Department of Transportation test manual as characterizing HGN as
"the

single

most

accurate

field

test

whether a person is alcohol impaired."
N.E.2d

1330,

1336

(Ohio

1990).

The

to

use

in

determining

State v. Bresson, 554
only

foundation

is

the

officer's training and ability to administer and interpret that
test and the results are admissible as any field sobriety tests.
Id.; See also State v. Scott, 606 N.E.2d 1023 (Ohio App. 3 Dist.
1992);

State

v.

Clark,

Murphy, 451 N.W.2d 154

762

P.2d

853

(Mont.

1988);

State

v.

(Iowa 1990); State v. Nagel, 506 N.E.2d

285 (Ohio App. 1986) .
State v. Grier, 791 P.2d 627 (Alaska App. 1990), addressed
only the issue of whether HGN was in itself sufficient probable
causes to arrest.
except the HGN.

Defendant passed all the field sobriety tests
He was arrested and a subsequent breath test

showed .145 percent.

Defendant's independent blood test was .115

percent.
At

the

evidentiary

hearing,
21

in

addition

to

the

police

officers,

Dr.

pathologist,
reliable

Emery,

a

testified.

screening

intoxication.

Dr. Emery

test

Also

intoxication.

neurologist,

that

in
it

testified

his
was

and

Dr.

Propst,

a

that

HGN

a

profession
a

sensitive

for

was

alcohol

indicator

of

He also stated that the test was easy to learn and

administer and his review of the police training manuals led him
to believe officers could do "a very good job" of administering
the test to obtain reliable results.

Both Drs. Emery and Propst

testified that HGN is involuntary and cannot be practiced as can
other sobriety tests,

Id. at 629.

Dr. Emery also testified that

some people above a .10 percent can still perform adequately on
the sobriety tests and that the HGN test was the most accurate.
Id. at 631.

The court also had copies of the 1981 NHTSA Study

and the Goding & Dobie report.
The court determined the HGN test was sufficiently reliable
to

establish

probable

other sobriety tests.

cause

to arrest, when

defendant

passed

It declined to rule on whether HGN was

independent evidence of intoxication or whether it could be used
to corroborate a chemical test since those issues were not before
the court.

id. at 630.

Several other courts have admitted HGN evidence without a
discussion of its reliability.

State v. Sullivan. 426 N.E.2d 766

(S.C. 1993); Emerson v. State, 846 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1993); Finley v. State, 809 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1991); People v. Furnessr 526 N.E.2d 947 (111. App.
5 Dist. 1988) .
But not all jurisdictions have allowed HGN evidence.
22

In

each

of

these

testimony

of

insufficient.
or

that

cases, the prosecution

it

the

arresting

officer

relied
which

solely
the

upon

courts

the
held

None of these courts held HGN per se inadmissible
did

not

meet

Frye,

only

that

insufficient to make that determination.

the

evidence

was

People v. Loomis. 203

Cal. Rptr. 767 (Cal. Super. 1984); People v. Vega. 496 N.E.2d 501
(111. App. 4 Dist. 1986); State v. Rees. 732 P.2d 66

(Or. App.

1987) .
Defendant relies upon State v. Witte. 836 P. 2d 1110

(Kan.

1992) for the claim that HGN is scientifically unreliable because
the court concluded that the test's reliability was not a settled
proposition in the scientific community based on its review of
case law and some of the available literature.

Xd. at 1119-1120.

Although the court ruled against admissibility, it is not clear
whether the court found that the HGN test did not satisfy Frye or
that

there

was

insufficient

evidence

upon

which

to base

its

opinion.
Before this court rules on whether HGN satisfies the
Frye admissibility requirement, a trial court first
should have an opportunity to examine, weigh, and
decide disputed facts to determine whether the test is
sufficiently reliable to be admissible for any purpose
in Kansas.
Id.

at

1120.

The

only

evidence

arresting officer's testimony.
the

HGN

test

does

not

meet

reliability), the decision

presented

at

trial

was

the

If the court's holding is that
Frye

(or

some

other

measure

of

is clearly contrary to the current

trend to allow HGN evidence.

If, however, the court believed

there was insufficient foundation, then the result is that only

23

the evidence was insufficient to make a determination about the
admissibility of HGN.
There are several points of the Witte court's analysis that
are troubling.

For example, Witte cites Halperin and Yolton, as

expressing concerns over the use of HGN.

The court

seems to

ignore their expressed opinion that nystagmus is well-documented
scientifically and that "nystagmus testing is an important new
development in the fight against drunk drivers." 16
Witte
percent

also cites studies which

of

deviation.

the

population

will

show that

show

fifty

nystagmus

to

at

sixty

maximum

This concern was addressed in the 1981 NHTSA study.

It also ignores the other two components of the test.

If an

individual exhibits nystagmus only at maximum deviation, he will
"pass" the test.

Furthermore, the study which apparently is the

source of this statistic, does not support this proposition. 17
Defendant
test

because

questions Moretnson's ability to administer
the

angle

of

onset

is

estimated

by

the

visual

observation. While it is true that the laboratory studies use
mechanical

devices

suggestion

that

16

to

this

measure
is

the

either

angle,

feasible

there

has

or practical

been

no

for

an

Halperin and Yolton, supra at 657.

17

Whiting, State v^ Witte:
Questioning HGN's Frye General
Acceptance under Blake, Vol. 5, Issue 2, the DRE 7 (Spring 1993).
Whiting presents a thorough and critical analysis demonstrating
flaws in the Witte court's understanding and interpretation of
the scientific articles it cites.
The court apparently relied
more upon the secondary sources (written by defense attorneys)
interpreting these sources, than upon the primary sources
themselves.
24

officer in the field.
The

1984 NHTSA

learn to estimate

Study

specifically

discusses

the angle of onset.

Several

the need
of the

to

cases

referred to previously have cited as an advantage to the test the
ease

of

its

administration

at

roadside.

Learning

to

detect

nystagmus is probably the easiest procedure an officer will be
asked to learn.^ Forty-five degrees usually conforms to an area
level with the test subject's shoulder.

The higher the BAC, the

closer to the midline of the head nystagmus is noted. 19
Defendant

asserts

the

HGN

nystagmus may have other causes.
field

sobriety

percent

test.

perfect, only

No
that

one

test

is

unreliable

because

The same could be said for any
claims

they

are

that

the

tests

sufficiently

are

reliable

establish probable cause and some evidence of intoxication.

100
to
It

would be absurd to suppress the test documented to be the most
reliable in favor of less reliable tests because they are based
on

common

knowledge

that

alcohol

ingestion

causes

physical

effects. 20
Any objections to admitting HGN is best answered by pointing
out

its basic

similarity to other field sobriety tests.

All

roadside tests are based on the some "scientific principle" that
18

Forkiotis, QptQmetrig Expertise;
The Scientific Basis for
Alcohol Gazed Nystagmus, 59 (No. 7) Curriculum II 1 (1987) .
19

Id. at 11.

20

1981 NHTSA Study; Dobie annd Goding report; See also Good
and Augsbinger, Use of Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus as Part of
Roadside Sobriety Testing, 63 Am. J. of Optometry & Physiological
Optics 467 (1986).
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intoxication results in certain physiological reactions.
Given HGN's basic similarity to the other roadside tests,
any objection to its admissibility is most likely based on its
"pretentiously scientific name,"

Murphy, 451 N.W.2d at 156, or

the fact that it may lie outside of the average juror's realm of
common

experience.

See

Bresson,

554 N.E.2d

at

1336

("[t]he

admission of the results of the HGN tests is no different from
any other field sobriety test"); Murphy 451 N.W.2d at 157.
The Nagel court stated:
The gaze nystagmus test, as do the other commonly used
field sobriety tests, requires only the personal
observation of the officer administering it.
It is
objective in nature and does not required expert
interpretation.
Objective
manifestations
of
insobriety, personally observed by the officer, are
always relevant where, as here, the
defendant's
physical condition is in issue.
506 N.E.2d at 286.
The

Iowa court allowed the admission of an

administering

officer's testimony who was certified by the Iowa Law Enforcement
Academy as being competent to administer the HGN test.
451 N.W.2d at 156-58.

Murphy,

In a later instance, the court admitted

the testimony of an officer who received HGN instruction "as part
of

a department-sponsored

implemented

statewide."

program

of

education

that

State v. Edman, 453 N.W.2d

has

been

169, 170

(Iowa 1990).
The Blakely court found two officers' training

sufficient

when one had experienced "training in ... field administrations
of

the

agencies

HGN

test,"

and

another

had

trained

law

enforcement

in Arizona, Michigan, New York, Arkansas, Louisiana,
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North

Carolina,

and

Maryland

in

the

HGN

test,

and

had

subsequently administered the test under roadside conditions to
"several thousand individuals."

718 P. 2d at 177-78.

And the

Bresson court has held that an officer who had received five days
training in HGN could testify as to the results of a specific
instance of testing.

554 N.E.2d at 1335.

A Louisiana appellate court found HGN testimony admissible
where an officer "had extensive training . . .
testing.

The

administering

the

officer
HGN

had
test

been
and

specifically

had

department in administering the test."
887.

in field sobriety

been

trained

certified

by

in
his

Armstrong, 561 So.2d at

Montana held such testimony admissible where an officer

gained certification through the Montana Law Enforcement Academy
by completing a required number of training hours.
P. 2d at 857.

Clark, 762

A Texas court, without addressing the validity of

the test, has also held that the administering officer need not
show

foundation that he is an expert.

Howard v.

State, 744

S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)("any lay witness may give an
opinion regarding intoxication").
Mortenson has had extensive experience with the HGN test
during his last four years with the sheriff's office.

He has

attended drug recognition classes administered- by the NHTSA and
DUI classes with the Utah Highway Patrol.
sobriety

tests,

including

HGN,

at

He has performed field
least

400

times

and

investigated some fifty DUI cases.
During

his

testimony,

Mortensen

stated

that

when

he

conducted this test, he held a pen twelve to fifteen inches in
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front

of

defendant' s

eyes

defendant's field of vision.
eyes

failed

to

track

and

moved

the

pen

slowly

across

In doing this, he found defendant's

smoothly

and

nystagmus

was

present

at

maximum deviation.
Based

upon

Mortensen's

training

and

experience,

qualified to administer the HGN test to defendant.
the

evidence

defendant.

at

trial, he properly

he

was

Based upon

administered

the

test

to

At no time during the trial did defendant claim that

Mortensen improperly administer the test.
C.

TRIAL COURT COULD TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF INHERENT
RELIABILITY OF HGN TEST.

In Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 398, the court discussed two ways
in which

scientific

evidence may be presented:

notice or (2) an evidentiary hearing.
its determination

(1) judicial

"The trial court may base

on exhibits, treatises

or

the

rationale

of

cases in other jurisdictions."

Manley v. State, 424 S.E. 2d 818,

819

a

(Ga.

App.

1992).

Once

substantial

number

of

courts

recognize a procedure, a trial judge may take judicial notice of
its reliability without expert testimony.

Id. at 820.

In this case, we do not know why the court allowed the HGN
evidence because defendant failed to properly address the issue
prior to trial.

We can only surmise the court took

judicial

notice because it admitted the evidence without expert testimony.
If the court took judicial notice, it was appropriate based upon
the existing scientific literature and case law supporting HGN.
Its reliability is as high or higher than already
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judicially-

noticed sobriety tests.

Because of this reliability, the State

was not required to make a foundational showing through expert
witnesses of the test's scientific grounding or reliability.
III. IF DEFENDANT PRESEVERED MIRANDA ISSUE, POLICE WERE NOT
REQUIRED TO GIVE DEFENDANT MIRANDA WARNING BECAUSE HE
WAS NOT IN CUSTODY.
A

temporary

traffic

detention

violations

is

for

not

the

purpose

synonymous

with

interrogation requiring a Miranda warning.
Carner.

664

P.2d

1168,

1170

(Utah

of

investigating
a

custodial

Salt Lake City v.

1983).

Id.

Miranda

is

required when the environment becomes custodial or accusatory.
Custody is judged by "whether a reasonable person in defendant's
position would believe his 'freedom of action is curtailed to a
degree associated with a formal arrest.'" State v. Mirquet. 844
P.2d 995, 998

(Utah Ct. App. 1992)

(quoting State v. East. 743

P.2d 1211, 1212 (Utah 1987)).
The

earner

determining
purposes:

court

whether

a

adopted

four

defendant

is

factors
in

custody

(1) the site of the interrogation;

investigation focused on the accused;
indicia of arrest were present; and
interrogation.

Id. at 1171.

to

consider
for

in

Miranda

(2) whether

the

(3) whether the objective
(4) the length and form of

This court later recognized a fifth

factor: whether the defendant came to the place of interrogation
freely and willingly.

State v. Sampson.

808 P.2d

1100, 1105

(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Mirquet. 844 P.2d 995 is the most recent case in which this
court has applied all five factors.
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In that case, Officer Paul

Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol pulled Joseph Mirquet over
for

speeding

While

on

Interstate

they were

sitting

15 near Nephi, Utah. Id.

in the patrol

smelled the odor of burnt marijuana.

car, Trooper

Id.

at 996.
Mangelson

He remarked to Mirquet

'"[i]t's obvious to me that you've been smoking marijuana.
.You know, there's no question in my mind, Would you like to go
to the car and get the marijuana, or do you want me to go get
it?"'

Id.

In response, Mirquet went to his car and returned to

the patrol car with a cigarette package containing two rolled
'"joints."'

Id.

Trooper Mangleson then searched Mirquet's car

and found cocaine and more marijuana.

Id.

The trial court suppressed this evidence on the basis that
Mirquet was in custody when told to retrieve the marijuana and
entitled

to

Miranda

suppression order.
individually
factors

protections.

This

court

affirmed

It reasoned that while factors 1, 2, 3 and 5

could not support a conclusion of custody,

combined

the

with

the

accusatory

nature

of

these

Mangelson's

questions, made "a conclusion of custody inescapable."

id. at

1001.
Unlike

Mirquet,

application

of

instant case points away from custody.

the

five

factors

to

the

As to the first factor,

defendant was questioned on his home field: he was sitting inside
his

own

truck

in

residential area.

front

of

his

father's

home

located

in

a

This setting was as free of compulsion as can

occur when a person is questioned by police.
As to the second factor, the police found two occupants in
the

truck:

the defendant

and Webb.
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While

defendant

was

the

primary suspect, the police also spoke to Webb.

Not all of the

focus was on defendant.
As to the third factor, there were no readied handcuffs,
locked doors or drawn guns in this case.

Defendant was also in

his own truck and deputies were not accusing him of a crime.
As to the fourth factor, Mohler's questions to defendant
came shortly after his arrival.

He asked defendant whether he

had been involved in an accident on 9th East and Van Winkle.
This was neither an accusatory nor unduly coercive question.
was

open

response.

ended
This

nonincriminating
Winkle.

and

not

evident

likely
by

the

to

elicit

fact

that

an

It

incriminating

defendant

made

a

statement that he had been no where near Van

Mohler was attempting to establish whether the truck had

been involved in an accident.

Defendant's answer only became

incriminating when he contradicted himself by admitting he had
been on 9th East and Van Winkle when Mohler told him there were
witnesses.
As to the fifth factor, defendant himself had stopped at his
father's

house.

It

was

not

the

police

who

stopped

Defendant

is the one who decided when and where to stop.

him.
He

freely and willingly stopped.
Defendant claims that he was in custody because he was not
free to leave and relies Mohler's testimony that he would have
chased

him down had he

left.

However, the Supreme

Court

in

Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984), recognized that
all persons detained for traffic violations have their freedom
significantly restrained, and it is unlikely that a person in
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such a situation would ever feel free to leave.
not being

The feeling of

free to leave does not magically convert

investigation into custody.

a traffic

Detention must be tantamount to a

formal arrest before Miranda attaches.
The evidence related to each of the five factors of custody,
considered

either

individually

or

collectively,

leads

to

the

conclusion that a reasonable man in defendant's position would
not have believed that his freedom of action was curtailed to a
degree associated with an arrest to require a Miranda warning.
IV.

IF ADMISSION OF HGN AND STATEMENTS WERE ERROR,
IT WAS HARMLESS.
To

establish

prejudicial

error,

defendant

must

show

a

reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result in its absence.
State v. Feathersone, 781 P.2d 424, 431

(Utah 1989); State v.

Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

In view of the physical

evidence,

and

defendant's

other

statements

other

evidence

of

intoxication, he would still have been convicted of both charges
without HGN and his statements.
Defendant's

truck

matched

the

description

involved in an accident on 9th East and Van Winkle.

of

a

truck

The impact

of the accident caused a loud noise and extensive damage to two
cars.

His truck had white transfer paint on it that matched the

color of one of the two cars hit on 9th East.
Richards immediately smelled an odor of alcohol coming from
the cab of defendant's truck.

Mortensen also noticed an odor of

alcohol on defendant's breath and that his eyes were red and
glassy.

Defendant's speech was slightly slurred.
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Defendant did poorly on the field sobriety tests and had
difficulty understanding directions.

On the finger count test,

defendant touched the sides of his fingers, instead of the tips,
performed this test four times, instead of the requested three.
In the heel-to-toe, defendant used his arms for balance and had
difficulty balancing.

On the alphabet test, he started with the

letter A, instead of the letter B as instructed.
Defendant was also unable to do the one-leg stand.
his

foot

down on the count

of

five and

stopped

the

He put
test

at

fifteen.
On his way to take the test, defendant stated that he was
not going to lie to him anymore and admitted that he had had four
beers in the last hour and a half and would be over the legal
limit and it is just easier to do it this way.
Standing alone may be none of the foregoing items would be
sufficient to convict defendant.
accident,

defendant's

physical

However, the severity of the
appearance,

speech,

lack

of

balance, odor of alcohol, admission of drinking and being over
the legal limit, poor performance on the field sobriety tests and
refusal

to

take

a

chemical

test

all

support

the

conviction.

Although defendant testified he did not feel the effects of the
alcohol nor was under the influence or hear the accident, the
jury apparently did not believe him.
Defendant cites Ex Parte Malone v. City of Silverhill. 575
P. 2d

106,

for

harmless error.

the

proposition

that

HGN

evidence

cannot

be

The appellate court originally held harmless in

light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
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The Alabama Supreme

Court, however,

interpreted

the Alabama

statutes to require a

determination of whether a substantial right of the party had
been adversely affected and that overwhelming evidence of guilt
was insufficient.

Id. at 107.

Witte. 836 P. 2d 1112 also found reversible error.

In that

case, the intoxilyzer reading was .103 percent.

The court felt

that

determined

absent

HGN

evidence,

the

jury

intoxilyzer reading to be less than

may

have

the

.10 percent based on the

evidence concerning allowed tolerances of the machine.

TcL at

1121- 1122.
Neither of these two cases are applicable to this appeal.
Defendant

refused

a

breath

test

and

the

Utah

standard

for

harmless error differs from Alabama's.
CONCLUSION
Defendant has waived the HGN issue for appeal by failing to
timely file his motion to suppress, establish a record of the
court's decision and specifically object to the admission of the
evidence.

He cannot now raise this issue on appeal.

Assuming defendant has preserved the HGN issue, HGN is a
inherently reliable test and the appropriate subject of judicial
notice.

The

scientific
alcohol

literature

establishes

consumption

and

the

a

direct

correlation

between

onset

of

nystagmus.

It also demonstrates that inability of the eyes to

pursue a moving object without jerking may be alcohol induced.
The three-part test developed by the SCRI for NHTSA found the HGN
test

to be

the

intoxication.

single most

reliable

field

sobriety

test

for

Studies have shown a reliability of between 78 and
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92 percent.
Acceptance of HGN is the trend with a significant number of
courts ruling that the HGN test may be used to establish probable
cause as well as providing independent evidence of intoxication.
A

few

courts

have

found HGN reliable

under

a Frye

standard,

notably Arizona, and others have determined that there need only
be a showing of reliability without meeting Frye.
accepted

HGN

without

discussion

of

the

A few have

courts'

underlying

rationale.
Of the courts that have heard expert testimony or reviewed
the scientific literature, only Witte has found that reliability
is not yet a settled proposition.

The Witte court seems to have

based its opinion on a misunderstanding of the literature and
reliance on inadequate sources.
Defendant has also waived the Miranda issue.

During the

trail, he failed to specifically object to the evidence.

He also

failed to object to the same evidence when offered by a second
police witness.
If

defendant

also

preserved

this

issue

for

appeal,

police were not required tc give him a Miranda warning.

the

The five

factors for determining custody all point toward the conclusion
that his incriminating statements were made while the police were
merely investigating the accident.

Defendant was sitting in his

truck in front of his father's house, he was not the only police
questioned, he was being accused of committing a crime and he was
stopped before the police even arrived at his father's house.
In light of the other evidence of intoxication, defendant's
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other incriminating statements and physical evidence, any error
in the admission of HGN and defendant's statements was harmless,
and the jury verdict should be upheld.

ot\k
Dated this _[

day of December, 1994.
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ADDENDUM A

41-6-24
41-6-24.

MU'l'Ult

VCiHIUL.ll.v5

O^i

Traffic-control signal — At intersecsteady red signal may cautiously enter the
tions — At place other than intersecintersection to turn right, or may turn left
tion — Color of light signal — Inoperafrom a one-way street into a one-way street,
tive traffic-control signals.
after stopping as required by Subsection
(1) (a) Green, red, and yellow are the only colors
(4)(a).
that may he used in traffic-control signals, except
(ii) The vehicular traffic shall yield the
for special pedestrian signals that may use white
right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within
and orange.
an adjacent crosswalk and to other traffic
(b) Traffic-control signals indicate and apply
lawfully using the intersection.
to operators of vehicles and pedestrians as pro(5) (a) This section applies where an official trafvided in this section.
fic-control signal is erected and maintained at an
(2) (a) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (ii), veintersection or at a place other than an intersechicular traffic facing a circular green signal
tion.
may:
(b) Any stop required shall be made at a sign
(A) proceed straight through the inor marking on the highway pavement indicating
tersection;
where the stop shall be made, but, in the absence
(B) turn right; or
of any sign or marking, the stop shall be made it
(C) turn left.
the signal.
(ii) Vehicular traffic facing a circular
(6) The operator of a vehicle approaching an inter*
green signal, including vehicles turning
section that has an official traffic-control signal that
right or left:
is inoperative shall stop before entering the Intersec(A) shall yield the right-of-way to tion and shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle M
other vehicles and to pedestrians lawrequired under Section 41-6-72.
INS
fully within the intersection or an adjacent crosswalk at the time the signal is
41-6-25. Special pedestrian-control signals —
exhibited; and
Meaning of signals — Rights and do*
(B) may not turn right or left if a sign
ties.
at the intersection prohibits the turn.
When special pedestrian-control signals exhibiting
(b) Vehicular traffic facing a green arrow sigthe words "Walk" or "Don't Walk" or symbols of
nal shown alone or in combination with other
"Walking Person" or "Upraised Palm" are in plaoa,
A
indication:
the signals indicate:
(i) may cautiously enter the intersection
(a) Flashing or steady "Walk" or symbol of
only to moke the movement indicated by the
"Walking Person" means a pedestrian facing the
arrow or other indication shown at the same
signal may proceed across the roadway in the
time; and
direction of the signal and the operators of all
(ii) shall yield the right-of-way to pedesvehicles shall yield the right-of-way to him.
trians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk
(b) Flashing or steady "Don't Walk" of
and to other traffic lawfully using the inter"Upraised Palm" means a pedestrian may not
section.
start to cross the roadway in the direction of the
(c) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestriansignal, but a pedestrian who has partially conv\
control signal under Section 41-6-25, pedestrians
pleted his crossing on the walk signal shall profacing any green signal other than a green turn
ceed to a sidewalk or safety island while the
arrow may proceed across the roadway within
"Don't Walk" or "Upraised Palm" signal is showany marked or unmarked crosswalk.
ing.
Ittf
(3) (a) Vehicular traffic facing a steady circular
yellow or yellow arrow signal is warned that the
41 -6-26. Flashing red or yellow signals — Rights
allowable movement related to a green signal is
and duties of operators — RallroW
being terminated.
grade crossings excluded.
(b) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian(1) When an illuminated flashing red or yellow tig*
control signal under Section 41-6-25, pedestrians
nal is used in a traffic signal or with a traffic ilgn,
facing a steady circular yellow or yellow arrow
vehicular traffic shall obey it as follows:
signal ore advised that there is insufficient time
(a) Flashing red stop signal: When a red signal
to cross the roadway before a red indication is
is illuminated by rapid intermittent flashes, opshown, and a pedestrian may not start to cross
erators of vehicles shall stop at a clearly marked
the roadway.
stop line, but if none, before entering the cross(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(c), vewalk on the nearest side of the intersection, or If
hicular traffic facing a steady circular red or red
none, then at a point nearest the intersecting
arrow signal:
roadway where the operator has a view of ap»
(i) may not enter the intersection unless
entering the iintersection to make a moveproaching traffic on the intersecting roadway bement permitted by another indication; and
fore entering. The right to proceed is subject It
(ii) shall stop at a clearly marked stop
the rules applicable after making a stop at a step
line, but if none, before entering the marked
sign.
or unmarked crosswalk on the near side of
(b) Flashing yellow caution signal: When I
the intersection and shall remain stopped
yellow signal is illuminated with rapid intermituntil an indication to proceed is shown,
tent flashes, operators of vehicles may proceed
(b) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrianthrough the intersection or past the signal otiy
control signal under Section 41-6-25, pedestrians
with caution.
facing a steady red signal alone may not enter
(2) This section does not apply at railroad gnsiV

OIO

IV1U1VJIV. YE*Illl/LiILi3

41-6-26.5. Lane use control signals — Colors.
When lane use control signals are placed over individual lanes, the signals indicate and apply to operators of vehicles as follows:
(1) Green signal — vehicular traffic may
travel in any lane over which a green signal is
shown.
(2) Steady yellow signal — vehicular traffic is
warned that a lane control change is being made.
(3) Steady red signal — vehicular traffic may
not enter or travel in any lane over which a red
signal is shown.
(4) Flashing yellow signal — vehicular traffic
may use the lane only for the purpose of approaching and making a left turn.
iwn
41-6-27.

Prohibition of unauthorized signs, signals, lights or markings — Commercial
advertising — Public nuisance — Removal.
(1) A person may not place, maintain, or display
upon or in view of any highway any unauthorized
•ign, signal, light, marking, or device which purports
to be or is an imitation of or resembles an official
traffic-control device or railroad sign or signal, or authorized emergency vehicle flashing light, or which:
(a) attempts to direct the movement of traffic;
(b) hides from view or interferes with the effectiveness of any official traffic-control device or
any railroad sign or signal; or
(c) which is of such brilliant illumination and
so positioned as to blind or dazzle an operator on
any adjacent highway.
(2) A person may not place or maintain nor may
any public authority permit upon any highway any
traffic sign or signal bearing on it any commercial
advertising except for business signs included as part
of official motorist service panels approved by the Department of Transportation. This provision does not
prohibit the erection upon private property adjacent
to highways of signs giving useful directional information and of a type that may not be mistaken for
official signs.
(3) Every prohibited sign, signal, or light, or marking Is declared to be a public nuisance and the authority having jurisdiction over the highways may
remove it or cause it to be removed without notice.
1987

41-6-28.

Interference with signs and signals
prohibited.
A person may not without lawful authority attempt
to or in fact alter, deface, injure, knock down, or remove any official traffic-control device or any railroad
sign or signal or any inscription, shield, or insignia
•tilt, or any other part of it.
ies7
ARTICLE 4
ACCIDENTS
41-6-29. Operator's duty at accident — Stop nt
accident — Penalty.
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accioVnt resulting in injury to or death of any person
•hall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the
accident or as close to it as possible and shall immediately return to and remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the reauirements of Section

ii-o-j;

(2) A person falling to stop or to comply with th
requirements of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class 1
misdemeanor.
is*
41-6-30.

Accidents Involving d a m a g e to vehicl
or property — Stop at accident.
The operator of a vehicle involved In an acciden
resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other prop
erty which Is operated or attended by any persor
shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of th
accident or as close to it as possible, and shall Imme
diately return to and remain at the scene of the ace
dent until he has fulfilled the requirements of Sectio
41-6-31. The stop may not obstruct traffic more tha
Is necessary.
IP>
41-6-31.

Accident involving Injury, death, 0
property d a m a g e — Duties of operatoi
occupant,
owner,
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an ace
dent resulting In Injury to or death of any person c
damage to any vehicle or other property, if the veh
cle or other property is operated, occupied, or a
tended by any person or if the owner of the vehicle c
property is present, shall:
(a) give to the persons involved his name, a<
dress, and the registration number of the vehicl
he Is operating;
(b) upon request and if available, exhibit h
operator's license to:
(i) any investigating pence officer presen
(ii) the person struck;
(Hi) the operator, occupant of, or perse
attending the vehicle or other property dar
aged In the accident; and
(iv) the owner of property damaged in tl
accident, if present; and
(c) render to any person injured in the collisir
reasonable assistance, Including the transpor
ing, or the making of arrangements for the tron
porting, of the person to a physician, surgeon,
hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it
apparent that treatment is necessary or if tl
transporting is requested by the Injured perso
(2) The operator of a vehicle involved in an ac<
dent resulting in injury to or death of any person
property damage to an apparent extent of $750
more shall immediately and by the quickest means
communication available give notire of the accide
to the nearest office of a law enforcement agenc
(3) If the operator of a vehicle is physically incsp
ble of giving an immediate notice of an accident
required in Subsections (1) and (2) and there is a
other occupant in the vehicle at the time of the ac<
dent capable of giving an immediate notice. il« •"•r
pant shall give or cause to be given the n . . 1
quired of the operator under this section.
(4) If the operator \r. physically incapable of mn
ing a written report of an accident when requir
under Section 41-6-35 and he is not the owner of t
vehicle, then the owner of the vehicle involved in t
accident shall within 15 days afier becoming aware
the accident make the report required of the opornl
under this section.
1
41-6-32.

Collision with unattended vehicle
other property — Duties of operate
The operator of a vehicle which collides with or
involved in an accident with any vehicle or oil
property which is unattended snd which results
Hamncp in the oth#»r vehirJp nr nrnwriv nhnll imm»

..IIC noving aiconol In
the blood or while under the influence of alcohol or
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and
any drug or that governs In relation to any of those
matters the use of a chemical test or chemical tests,
or evidentiary presumptions or penalties or that
governs any combination of those matters shall be
consistent with the provisions in this code which gov
ern those matters
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that
governs reckless driving or operating a vehicle In
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons
or property shall be consistent with the provisions of
this code which govern those matters
1W7
41 6 43 10

Repealed

less

41 6-44

D r i v i n g u n d e r the Influence of alcohol,
d r u g s , o r with specified o r u n s a f e
blood alcohol c o n c e n t r a t i o n — Mea
s u r e m e n t of blood o r b r e a t h alcohol —
C r i m i n a l p u n i s h m e n t — A r r e s t with
out w a r r a n t — Penalties — Suspension
or r e v o c a t i o n of license — P e n a l t i e s
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this state if
the person

(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentra
tion of 08 grams or greater as shown by a
chemical test given within two hours after
the alleged operation or physical control or
(li) is under the influence of alcohol any
drug or the combined influence of alcohol
and any drug to a degree that renders the
person incapable of safely operating a vehi
cle
(b) The fact that a person charged with violat
ing this section is or has been legally entitled to
use alcohol or a drug Is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of
blood and alcohol concentration in the breath shall
be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of
breath
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time
of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a
(i) class B misdemeanor or
(li) class A misdemeanor if the person
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury
upon another as a proximate result of
having operated the vehicle in a negh
gent manner or
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of
age In the vehicle at the time of the of
fense
(b) fn this section the standard of negligence
is that of simple negligence the failure to exer
cine that d< ^ree of care that an oidmanly reason
able and prudent person exercises under like or
similar circumstances
(c) in this section a reference to this section
tnclulrs any similar local oidinance adopted in
compliance with Section 41 6 43
4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court
shall upon a first conviction impose a manda
tory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive
hours nor more than 240 hours
(b) The court may as an alternative to jail
require the person to work in a community ser
vice >\ork program for not less than 24 hours nor
more than 50 hours

(c) (t) In addition to the jail sentence or com
munity service work program, the court
shall order the person to participate In in
assessment and educational series at a II*
censed alcohol or drug dependency rehabili*
tatton facility as appropriate
(n) For a violation committed after July 1,
1993, the court may order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug depen
dency rehabilitation facility if the licensed
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation fa
cility determines that the person has a problem condition involving alcohol or drugs
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation
committed within six years of a prior violation
under this section the court shall as part of any
sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not
less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than
720 hours
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail,
require the person to work in a community service work program for not less than 80 hours nor
more than 240 hours
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or comma
nity service work program the court shall order
the person to participate in an assessment and
educational series at a licensed alcohol or druf
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate The court may, in its discretion, order tht
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed
within six years of two prior violations under thia
section is a
(0 class B misdemeanor except as |m>
vided in Subsections (n) and (7), and
(n) class A misdemeanor if both of tht
prior convictions are for violations committed after April 23, 1990
j>
(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall
as part of any sentence impose a mandatory
jail sentence of not less than 720 nor roort
than 2 160 hours
(n) The court may, as an alternative U
jail require the person to work in a comim>
nity service work program for not less thai
240 nor more than 720 hours
*
(in) In addition to the jail sentence or eott*
munity service work program, the court
shall order the person to obtain treatment al
an alcohol oh drug dependency rehabilitation
facility, as appropriate
#
(c) (i) Under Subsection (a)(n) the court shall
as part of any sentence impose a fine of not
less than $1 000 and impose a mandatory jail
sentence of not less than 720 hours nor mora
than 2 160 hours
*
(ii) The court may as an alternative It
jail require the person to work in a comiwa*
nity service work program for not less that
240 nor more than 720 hours but only if U*
court enters in writing on the record the raa>
son it finds the defendant should not e m t
the jail sentence Enrollment in and cornplttion of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by the court
may be a sentencing alternative to incartar*
ation or community service if the progrtJi
provides intensive care or inpatient tratfV
ment and long term closely supervised fotlav
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(in) In addition to the jail sentence or com
munity service work program, the court
shall order the person to obtain treatment at
an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a vio
lation committed within six years of the prior
violations under this section Is a third degree fel
ony if at least three prior convictions are for vio
lations committed after April 23 1990
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence im
pose a fine of not less than $1 000 and impose a
mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720
hours nor more than 2 160 hours
(c) (i) The court may as an alternative to jail
require the person to work in a community
service work program for not less than 240
nor more than 720 hours, but only if the
court enters in writing on the record the rea
son it finds the defendant should not serve
the jail sentence
(li) Enrollment in and completion of an al
cohol or drug dependency rehabilitation pro
gram approved by the court may be a sen
tencing alternative to incarceration or com
munity service if the program provides in
tensive care or inpatient treatment and long
term closely supervised follow through after
the treatment
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or commu
nity service work program the court shall order
the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation facility
(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence re
quired under this section may not be suspended
and the convicted person is not eligible for parole
or probation until any sentence Imposed under
this section has been served Probation or parole
resulting from a conviction for a violation under
this section may not be terminated
(b) The department may not reinstate any li
cense suspended or revoked as a result of the con
viction under this section until the convicted
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the
department that
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency
assessment, education treatment and reha
bilttation ordered for a violation committed
after July 1, 1993, have been completed
(li) all fines and fees including fees for res
titution and rehabilitation costs assessed
against the person have been paid if the con
viction Is a second or subsequent conviction
for a violation committed within six years of
a prior violation and
(in) the person does not use drugs in any
abusive or illegal manner as certified by a
licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabili
tation facility if the conviction is for a third
or subsequent conviction for a violation com
mitted within six years of two prior viola
tions committed after July 1 1993
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4) (5)
(6) and (7) that require a sentencing court to
order a convicted person to participate in on
assessment and educational series at a li
censed alcohol or drug dependency rehabili
tation facility, obtain in the discretion of the
court treatment at an alcohol or drug depen
dency rehabilitation facility, obtain mn«/i«.

41-6-4

combination of those things apply to a con
viction for a violation of Section 41 6 45 the
qualifies as a prior conviction under Subsec
tion (10)
(li) The court shall render the same ordei
regarding education or treatment at an nlco
hoi or drug dependency rehabilitation facil
ity, or both In connection with a first sec
ond, or subsequent conviction under Section
41 6 45 that qualifies as a prior conviction
under Subsection (10) as the court would
render in connection with applying respec
tlvely, the first second or subsequent con
viction requirements of Subsections (4) (5)
(6) and (7)
(b) For purposes of determining whether a con
viction under Section 41 6 45 that qualified as a
prior conviction under Subsection (10) is a first
second or subsequent conviction under this sub
section a previous conviction under either this
section or Section 41 6 45 Is considered a prior
conviction
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilita
tion program and any community based or other
education program provided for in this section
shall be approved by the Department of Human
Services
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea
of guilty or no contest to a charge of a viola
tion of Section 41 6 45 or of an ordinance en
acted under Section 41 b 43 in satisfaction
of or as a substitute for an original charge
of a violation of this section the prosecution
shall state for the record a factual basis for
the plea including whether or not there had
been consumption of alcohol drugs or a com
binatlon of both by the defendant in connec
tion with the violation
(n) The statement is an ofier of proof of
the facts that shows whether there was con
sumption of alcohol drugs or a combination
of both by the defendant in connection with
the violation
(b) (I) The court shall advise the defendant be
fore accepting the plea ofTered under this
subsection of the consequences of a violation
of Section 41 6 45 as follows
(il) If the court accepts the defendants
plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of
violating Section 41 6 45 and the prosecutor
states for the record that there was conaump
tion of alcohol drugs or a combination of
both by the defendant in connection with
the violation the resulting conviction is a
prior conviction for the purposes of Subsec
tions (5) (6) and (7)
(c) The court shall notify the department of
each conviction of Section 41 6 15 that is a prior
offense for the purposes of Subsections (5) (6)
and (7)

(11) A peace officer may without a warrant arrest
a person for a violation of this section when the offi
cer has probable cause to believe the violation has
occurred although not in his presence and if the offi
cer has probable cause to believe that the violation
was committed by the person
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall
(i) suspend for 90 days the operators li
cense of a person rnnt>i"»~J * •

MOTOR VEHICLES

II 6 44 1

under Subsection (1) tf the violation is com
mltted within a period of six years from the
date of the prior violation
(b) The department shall subtract from any
suspension or revocation period the number of
days for which a license was previously sus
pended under Section 63 3 223, if the previous
suspension was based on the eame occurrence
upon which the record of conviction is based 19M
41 8 44 1

Procedures — Adjudicative proceed
ings
The Department of Public Safety shall comply with
the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter
46b in its adjudicative proceedings
1087
41 6 44 2

Repealed
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Standards for chemical breath analy
sis — Evidence
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety shall establish standards for the adminlstra
tion and interpretation of chemical analysis of a per
eons breath Including standards of training
(2) In any action or proceeding In which It is mate
rial to prove that a person was operating or in actual
physical control of a vehicle while under the influ
ence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood
or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited docu
ments offered as memoranda or records of acts condi
tions or events to prove that the analysis was made
and the instrument used was accurate according to
standards established in Subsection (1), are admlssi
ble if
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the
regular course of the investigation at or about
the time of the act, condition or event, and
(b) the source of information from which made
and the method and circumstances of their prepa
ration indicate their trustworthiness
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established
under Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection
(2) have been met there is a presumption that the
test results are valid and further foundation for Intro
duction of the evidence is unnecessary
1&87
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Person under 21 may not operate ve
h i d e with detectable alcohol In body
— Chemical teat procedures — Tempo
rary license — Hearing and decision —
Suspension of license or operating
privilege — Fees — Judicial review
(1) (a) As used in this section local substance
abuse authority has the same meaning as pro
vided in Section 62A 8 101
(b) Calculations of blood breath or urine alco
hoi concentration under this section shall be
made in accordance with the procedures in Sub
section 41 6 44(2)
(2) (a) A person younger than 21 years of age may
not operate or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle with any mensurable blood breath or
urine alcohol concentration in his body as shown
by a chemical test
(b) (i) A person with a valid operator license
who violates Subsection (a), in addition to
any other applicable penalties arising out of
the incident shall have his operator license
denied or suspended as provided In Subsec
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deny the perBon'a operator license if or
dered or not challenged under this section for a period of 90 days beginning oil
the 30th day alter the date of the arret!
under Section 32A 12 209
(B) For a second or subsequent offense
under Subsection (a), within three yearn
of a prior denial or suspension, tht
Driver License Division shall suspend
the persona operator license for a period
of one year beginning on the 30th day
after the date of arrest
(c) (i) A person who has not been Issued an
operator hcense who violates Subsection (a),
in addition to any other penalties arising out
of the incident, shall be punished as provided
in Subsection (ii)
(ii) For one year or until he is 17, which*
ever is longer, a person may not operate t
vehicle and the Driver License Division may
not Issue the person an operator license or
learners permit
(3) (a) When a peace officer has reasonable
grounds to believe that a person may be violatinf
or has violated Subsection (2) the peace officer
may in connection with arresting the person for
a violation of Section 32A 12 209, request thai
the person submit to a chemical test or tests ta be
administered in compliance with the standard!
under Section 41 6 44 10
(b) The peace officer shall advise a person
prior to the persona submission to a chemical
test that a test result indicating a violation ef
Subsection (2)(a) will result in denial or suspeo*
sion of the person's license to operate a motor
vehicle or a refusal to issue a license
(c) If the person submits to a chemical test and
the test results indicate a blood breath, or urine
alcohol content in violation of Subsection (2XaX
or if the officer makes a determination, based e*
reasonable grounds that the person is otherwise
in violation of Subsection (2)(a) the officer direct*
ing administration of the test or making the determination shall serve on the person on behalf
of the Driver License Division Immediate notice
of the Driver License Division s intention to deny
or suspend the person a license to operate a retaV
cle or refusal to issue a license under Subsection
k
(2)
(4) When the officer serves Immediate notice #ft
behalf of the Driver License Division, he shall
(a) take the Utah license certificate or pern**
if any of the operator,
(b) issue a temporary license certificate eft***
tive for only 29 days if the driver had t Vatt|
operators license, and
(c) supply to the operator, on a form to be approved by the Driver License Division, basic la>
formation regarding how to obtain a proOfi
hearing before the Driver License Division
(5) A citation issued by the officer may, if approved
as to form by the Driver License Division, eenre ela)
as the temporary Hcense certificate under SubeecUet
(4Kb)
(6) The peace officer serving the notice shall leal
to the Driver License Division within five dayi alia?
the date of arrest and service of the notice
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(c) a signed report on a form approved by the
Driver License Division indicating the chemical
test results, If any, and
(d) any other basis for the officer's determine
tion that the person has violated Subsection (2)
(?) (a) (i) Upon written request, the Driver Li
cense Division shall grant to the person an
opportunity to be heard within 29 days after
the date of arrest under Section 32A 12 209
(ii) The request shall be made within ten
days of the date of the arrest
(b) A hearing, if held, shall be before the
Driver License Division in the county in which
the arrest occurred, unless the Driver License Di
vision and tho person agree that the hearing may
be held in some other county
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall
cover the issues of
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable
grounds to believe the person was operating
a motor vehicle In violation of Subsection
(2)(a),
fn) whether the person refused to submit
to the test, and
(m) the test results if any
(d) In connection with a hearing the Driver Li
cense Division or its authorised agent may ad
minister oaths and may issue subpoenas for the
attendance of witnesses and the production of rel
evant books and papers
(e) One or more members of the Driver License
Division may conduct the hearing
(0 Any decision made after a hearing before
any number of the members of the Driver I i
cense Division is as valid as if made after a hear
Ing before the full membership of the Driver Li
cense Division
(g) After the hearing the Driver License Divi
alon shall order whether the person
(l) with a valid license to operate a motor
vehicle will have his license denied or not or
suspended or not, or
(ii) without a valid operator license will be
refused a license under Subsection (2)(c)
(h) If the person for whom the hearing in hold
fails to appear before the Driver License Division
aa required in the notice the division shall order
whether the person shall have his license denied
suspended or not denied or suspended or
whether an operator license will be refused or not
refused
(8) (a) Following denial or suspension the Driver
License Division shall assess against a person in
addition to any fee Imposed under Subsection
63 3 205(14) a fee under Section 53 3 105 which
shall be paid before the person s driving privilege
la reinstated to cover administrative costs This
fee shall be canceled if the person obtains an un
appealed Driver License Division hearing or
court decision that the suspension was not
proper
(b) A person whose operator license has been
denied suspended, or postponed by the Driver
License Division under this section may file a
petition within 30 daya after the suspension for a
hearing on the matter which if held is governed
by Section 63 3 224
(9) After reinstatement of an operator license for a
Iret offense under this section a report authorized
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of any other offense for which the denial or suspen
sion may be extended
(10) The provisions of 8ectlona 4l-12a411 and
41 12a 412 do not apply to a denial or suspension
imposed for a first offense under this section if the
denial or suspension is based solely on a violation of
Subsectioa (2)(a)
(11) (a) In addition to the penalties In Subsection
(2) a person who violates Subsection (2)(a) shall
be referred by the Driver I icense Division to the
local substance abuse authoritv for an assess
ment and recommendation for appropriate ac
tion
(b) (i) Reinstatement of the persons operator
license or the right to obtain an operator li
cenae is contingent upon successful comple
tion of the action recommended by the local
substance abuse authority
(ii) The local substance abuse authority s
recommended action shall be determined by
an assessment of the person s alcohol abuse
and may include
(A) a targeted education and preven
tion program,
(B) an early intervention program or
(C) a suhstance abuse treatment pro
gram
(ill) Successful completion of the recom
mended action shall be determined by stnn
dards established by the Division of Sub
stance Abuse
(c) At the conclusion of the penalty period lm
posed under Subsection (2) the local substance
abuse authority shall notify the Driver license
Division of the person s status regarding comple
tion of the recommended action
(d) The local substance abuse authorities shall
cooperate with the Driver License Division in
(i) conducting the assessments
(u) making appropriate recommendations
for action, and
(ill) notifying the Driver I icense Division
about the persons status regarding comple
tion of the recommended action
(e) (I) The local substance abuse authority is
responsible for
(A) the cost of the assessment of the
person s alcohol abuse and
(B) for making a referral to nn appro
priate program on the basis of the find
Ings of the assessment
(il) (A) The person who violated Subsec
tion (2KB) IS responsible for all costs and
fees associated with the recommended
program to which the pernnn is referred
(B) fhe costs and foes under Subsec
tion (A) shall be based on a sliding senh
consistent with the local substinc<
abuse authority s policies and practice
regarding fee* tor services
IM
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Admissibility of chemtcn! test result
in actions for driving under the Influ
e n c e — Weight of evidence
(1) (a) in any civil or criminal action or proceedin
in which it is material to prove that a person wa
operating or in actual physical control of a veh
cle while under the influence of alcohol or dru^
or with a blood or breath alcohol content stati
tnrilv nrohibited the results of a chemical test c

